

26 January 1976

George,

Re the attached (which I have just received), Dr. Hall's comment on Korea (footnote 276, p. 155) accurately reflects part of the picture; the other part, of course, is the intensive Community effort, underway since last year's KIQ Strategy Report, to remedy our deficiencies with respect to intelligence on and understanding of the ROK armed forces in all aspects of their performance. I'm not sure, however, that Dick Lehman's draft -- which I think is excellent -- has a place for comment at the level of detail.




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SUBJECT: COMMENTS ON THE ATTACHED

1. A very basic comment on the question of the 1974 Indian nuclear test: While ~~the evidence~~ it is true that no specific warning was given just before the Indians set off their explosion, there had been repeated warning throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s that it was well within India's capabilities to go nuclear with very little additional preparation. This theme was repeated in any number of NIEs on the subject of nuclear proliferation.



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I concur.

Certainly the progress we have made toward meaningful arms control agreements is a case in point. The Intelligence Community has over the last ten years improved its capabilities to follow the activities of Soviet military forces to the extent that the U.S. has been able to enter into arms control negotiations confident that adherence to the resultant treaties could be monitored. The savings that have flowed from just the first of these arms control agreements has repaid the intelligence effort. The scope of the negotiations has expanded to cover new areas from which reductions in armament expenditures and more importantly, reduction in the risk of major war, are likely to result.